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Guerrilla movements throughout the world have assumed various forms.
They generally can be classified into two major types: partisan bands of
resistance and harassment supporting the national troops, and dissident
groups engaging in.similar tactics against the army and centers of power of
a nation. Such a classification does certainly lead to a risk of over-sim-
plification, but it serves well to distinguish the basic motivations which may
prompt the formation of irregular forces.
Although the term "wars of liberation" (and even "guerrilla warfare" as
used to refer to such conflicts) is of recent usage, the concept certainly is
not. Revolutionary wars and fights for independence have been occurring
throughout the history of mankind. Yet the rapidly increasing technology
of warfare during the last three-quarters of a century seemed at times to
make guerrilla warfare obsolete. Everyone looked toward the ultimate
conflict or major brush fire flare-ups in their thinking about war, including
the law of war. "The state of the law may not seem satisfactory, but it must
not be overlooked that when the rules were devised revolutionary wars
were of little significance."'
Consequently, the status of the guerrillas and their movements in inter-
national law is a matter of some controversy. This article is directed
primarily toward helping to clarify their position. The general philosophy
or rationales of the guerrillas for their actions will be considered first. Then
the status of the guerrilla movements in international law will be analyzed
in relation to their rationales.
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General Philosophy of the Guerrillas
The guerrilla movements in each Latin American country have at some
time or another resorted to violence. A common consensus that force is
sometimes necessary pervades their principles. But they do not advocate
indiscriminate acts of violence; nor do they generally engage in such
practices. Yet they clearly see that the way to success is through force.
Che Guevara wrote:
People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals
within the framework of civil debate. When the forces of oppression come to
maintain themselves in power against established law, peace is considered
already broken. 2
Actually, the guerrillas' justification for the use of violence might be
summarized as the "no-other-way" rationale. The argument is simply that
no alternative exists. With real justice suppressed and kept down by mili-
tary strength, violence is accepted as the only means of restoring true
legality3 A clandestine interview by a Newsweek correspondent with a
leader of the outlawed National Students' Union is illustrative of the
guerrillas' attitude:
If there was no repression, things wouldn't be so violent. However, all forms
of legal and parliamentary opposition to the government were eliminated long
ago. Our country (Brazil) has only a ghost of a Congress. There is no
meaningful vote. In other words, we have had no choice. The only road left to
us is violence. 4
The guerrillas claim to carry on the struggle for the benefit of the people
who are oppressed by the r6gime. It is clear that such representation
provides the only basis of clothing their campaigns with any legitimacy. It
is also clear that such representation is essential to the success of the
mission.
Guerrilla warfare is a people's war, a mass struggle. To try to carry out this
type of war without the support of the population is to court inevitable
disaster.5
The truth of Che's statement was ironically proven by his own example.
The inability to enlist the support of the Bolivian peasantry was a main
reason for his downfall. Che's men tried constantly to persuade the pea-
sants. Their misconceptions of the Bolivian peasants' revolutionary fervor
was a major mistake.
The guerrillas plan their methods, violent and otherwise, to expose
2E. (CHE) GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE 15 (1961).
3See E. GUEVARA, Id. at 26, and Geyer, The Blood of Guatemala, NATION, July 8,
1968, at 8-9.
4 NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 1969, at 67.
5 E.(_CHE) GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE-A METHOD 2 (1964).
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governmental repression. The idea is to break down the facade of legality
of those in power. By pressuring a dictator, they believe he can be forced
to show his true oppressive nature. Once that oppression is demonstrated
to the people, the guerrillas reason that the masses will join their campaign
in increasing numbers9
Latin American revolutionaries have thus turned increasingly to the use
of armed conflict in order to gain control of various countries. The use of
violence which accompanies such conflicts is advanced as a necessary
ingredient in order to restore true legality. Does such a justification fit
within the context of international law? The pursuit of this inquiry will first
require an examination of the position of the guerrillas under international
law.
Status of the Guerrillas in International Law
An understanding of the status of guerrillas in international law requires
discussion of the nature of belligerency and insurgency. These terms of art
are labels which denote the existence of certain factual conditions and the
legal results which attach thereto. The reason for much of the confusion in
this area is that even some of the foremost scholars in the field of inter-
national law have tended to list, as pre-condtions to the recognition of
belligerency, conditions which are actually a legal result of attaching the
label.
Lauterpacht (Oppenheim) contends that states alone possess the legal
qualifications in international law to become belligerents, 7 but that posses-
sion of actual power to make war enables insurgents to become belligerents
through recognition." He lists four necessary conditions of facts which
"create for other states the right and duty to recognize belligerency."
I. Actual hostilities amounting to civil war within a state.
2. The occupation, and some measure of orderly administration, of a
substantial portion of the national territory by the insurgent forces.
3. The observance of the rules of warfare by the insurgent forces acting
under a reasonable authority.
4. The practical necessity for other states to define their attitude to the
civil war.9
The inclusion of the third category as a precondition to the recognition
of belligerency is highly objectionable. It seems inconsistent to say that the
6See Id. at 7, 11; NEWSWEEK, supra note 4; Gerassi, Uruguay's Urban Guerrillas,
NATION, Sept. 29, 1969, at 307.
711 H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (7th ed. 1952).
8 lbid., at 249.
91d.
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insurgent forces must abide by such laws if those same laws do not indeed
apply reciprocally to themselves.
The Hague Convention specifically indicates that "the laws, rights, and
duties of war apply not only to the army, but also to militia and volunteer
corps fulfilling all the following conditions:
1. They must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates;
2. They must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
3. They must carry arms openly; and
4. They must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war."' 1
Guerrilla movements do not meet those conditions. Various courts con-
ducting war-crimes trials following the Second World War, found that
"guerrillas were not entitled to be classed as lawful belligerents for the
reason that they did not comply with the terms of the Hague Regu-
lations." 1
Full complaince with Article I of the Hague Rules is furthermore unlike-
ly. 12 Che Guevara noted, "If there is a real intention to begin the struggle
from some foreign country or from distant and remote regions within the
same country, it is obvious that it must begin in small conspiratorial
movements of secret members acting without mass support or knowl-
edge.' 3 Guerrillas are not going to carry arms openly or in any way mark
themselves distinctively. The essence of modern guerrilla warfare is to do
precisely the opposite. 14
The last condition listed by Lauterpacht (Oppenheim) as a condition for
recognition is advanced as necessary, in order to prevent illegal inter-
ferences in the internal affairs of the State beseiged by the hostilities. 15 It is
submitted that this last criterion is the only essential condition, and as such
it serves more nearly accurately to reflect actual practices by modern
states. Any decisions relating to recognition are, because discretion is
exercised, political, 16 and such decisions are truly moved by practical
necessity and interest.
10 Art. I of the 1907 regulations attached to the Hague Convention No. IV, 1907,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, U.S. TS 539, 36 Stat. 2295.
11H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 212- 13.1 2J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 566 (1959).
13E. GUEVARA, supra note 2, at 109.
14Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency'-Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 327- 28, 336-37 (1951).
15H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 249-50.
t6Rubin, The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, a paper privately
circulated to members of the American Society of International Law, to be published by the
INT'L & COMP. L.Q., at 3.
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Utilization of this sole criterion would undoubtedly still not lead to a
recognition of belligerency for any of the Latin American rebel movements
discussed in this article. But such a system would be more realistic, and
would eliminate such unbelievable requirements as compliance before ap-
plication. If some requirement relating to the observance of general-
ly-recognized rules of warfare should be deemed desirable, it would cer-
tainly be preferable to phrase the condition in tems of a willingness to
observe the rules. 17
Clearly though, whether the present standards are applied or some
which would be more realistic, the Latin American guerrilla movements
cannot meet them. Thus, their recognition as belligerents by third party
states is generally precluded as an illegal interference in internal affairs.
Deprived of this recognition, the guerrillas' status under international law
is determined primarily through the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Concern over the lack of protection which had been afforded to war
victims during the Second World War provided the impetus for a revision
of the Geneva Conventions. Work began in earnest in 1945 and on August
12, 1949, the text of the new Geneva Conventions was approved. The
result was four new Conventions, covering the wounded and sick in the
field, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war, and
civilian persons in time of war.' 8
Article 4 of the POW Convention defines prisoners of war. Basically,
the term includes persons who are members of the armed forces, militia, or
organized resistance movements of a Party to the conflict, who have fallen
into the hands of the enemy. For members of the last two groups to qualify,
however, they must meet four conditions-those listed in Article I of
the Hague Rules. The Latin American guerrilla movements have been
shown not to meet those criteria.
Not fitting within the defintion of the terms, the guerrillas do not qualify
as prisoners of war, and consequently they are not entitled to the protec-
17See C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (2d ed. 1945), citing J. Beale, Jr., The
Recognition of Cuban Belligerency, IX HARV. L. R. 406-07. Lauterpacht (Oppenheim)
himself notes, "As observance of the generally recognized rules of warfare is one of the
conditions of recognition of belligerency, recognition by other states provides evidence of the
ability and the willingness of the insurgents to observe these rules." H. LAUTERPACHT-L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 209. A close reading of the sentence shows that he would
require actual observance as the threshold to recognition and not simply a willingness to
comply.
1 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea) (Treatment of Prisoners of War) (Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War) opened for signature August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31, 85,
135, 287; 6 UST 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516;TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365.
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tions that result from attaching that label.1 9 The guerrillas do not have to be
confined under detailed rules regarding food, medical care and housing;
Article 4 does not protect against their being shot. 20 If one is legally
executed, it is not for a violation of international law, but rather for a
violation of local law for which international law afforded him no protec-
tion.
Baxter refers to their position as one of 'unprivileged belligerency': "A
guerrilla thus appears, like the spy, to be a belligerent who has failed to
meet conditions established by law for favored treatment upon capture.."
21
That term is perhaps not accurate as guerrillas are indeed not bellig-
erents-or perhaps one could say they are belligerents in fact but not in
law. The term would be accurate in the situation- yet to be discussed
wherein the parent state itself extends recognition of belligerency.
Finding the guerrillas cannot claim POW status, Baxter asks if they have
protection anywhere else. He refers to Article 5 of the Civilian Convention
and correctly indicates the expanded protection which applies to a guerrilla
in occupied territory.22 He claims, however, that "the failure of Article 5 to
refer to areas where fighting is in progress outside occupied territory, or the
territory of the detaining state, and suggests that both Articles 4 and 5
(Civilians Convention) were directed to the protection of inhabitants of
occupied areas, and of the mass of enemy aliens on enemy territory, and
that unlawful belligerents in the zone of operations were not taken into
account in connection with the two articles."123 He suggests, therefore, that
the suspect is entitled only to a judicial proceeding concerned with deter-
mining the POW status of the captured individual. 24
Baxter identifies incorrectly the nature of the trial to which the guerrilla
detained in the zone of operations is entitled. "The right of detained
persons to a fair and regular trial will be ensured, in occupied territory, by
applying the provisions of Articles 64 to 76; there are no special provisions
19H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (2d ed. 1966); H. LAU-
TERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 212; R. YINGLING and R. GINNANE, THE GEN-
EVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 402 (1952); 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 131-33, 159-61).20H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 257; H. KELSEN, supra note 19, at
131. 21Baxter, supra note 14, at 338.22Persons detained in occupied territories are protected specifically by Articles 64 to 76.
Article 68 even covers certain instances in which the death penalty is prohibited in such
cases.
2aBaxter, supra note 14, at 328.24
"The judicial proceeding to which a suspect is subjected is accordingly a determination
whether or not he meets the qualifications prescribed for treatment as a prisoner of war or as a
peaceful civilian. What formulation of law is necessary to permit his 'punishment' if he fails so
to qualify is essentially a matter of domestic law or practice." Id. at 338.
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applying to the territory of the Parties to the conflict but the rule contained
in Article 3 will be applicable: i.e., the Court must afford 'all the judicial
guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples'." 25
The judicial proceeding Baxter allows in the latter situation is only that
guaranteed under Article 5 of the POW Convention which has to do with
determining that status when any doubt exists. 26 The purpose of this
provision is to prevent the military officers from making this determination
by requiring responsibility for it in the detaining Power.27
The protections of the captured guerrilla do not end, however, with a
decision against POW status in the Article 5 proceeding. Before any
sentence may be passed or an execution carried out, the guerrilla is entitled
to a trial as provided in Article 3(l)(d).28 This article comes into effect if it
is determined that the captured individual cannot claim POW status. The
guerrilla can be executed for his activities, but only after the benefit of a
trial to determine guilt.
Such a trial is part of the humane standards provided in Article 3 which
applies to "armed conflict not of an international character." The Article is
common to all four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and was adopted largely
through the efforts of the Red Cross. 29 Violence to life and person, taking
of hostages, outrages on personal dignity, passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, and failure to collect and care for the wounded
and sick are all acts specifically prohibited for Parties to such conflicts,
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.
If the hostilities take place in the territory of a signatory to the Geneva
Conventions, the guerrillas may be covered to the extent of the humanita-
rian commands set forth in Article 3. The protection is conditioned upon
the hostilities being considered an "armed conflict." The legal effect of
such "recognition" is the direct application of Article 3 to both sides of the
conflict. If recognition of an armed conflict is not forthcoming, the parent
State will consider itself free to treat the guerrillas as common criminals
and deal with them solely in accordance with its own municipal law.
250. UHLER & H. COURSIER, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION 58 (J. PICTET
ed. 1958).26
"The judicial determination which is necessary before a person may be treated as an
unprivileged belligerent is in consequence not a determination of guilt but of status only and,
for the purposes of international law, it is sufficient to ascertain whether the conduct of the
individual has been such as to deny him the status of the prisoner or of the peaceful
civilian.... What is thereafter to be done to the individual who is found to lack a privileged
status is left to the discretion of the belligerent." Baxter, supra note 14, at 343-44.
27M. WHITEMAN, supra note 19, at 168; H. KELSEN, supra note 19, at 13 1.28M. WHITEMAN, supra note 19, at 168-69.
29See 0. UHLER AND H. COURSIER, supra note 25.
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The last sentence of Article 3 states that "the application of the pre-
ceeding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict." "This means, in particular, that the observance of the principles
laid down in the Convention does not amount to recognition of the bellig-
erency of the insurgents on the part of the legitimate government." 30
A recognition of "insurgency," however, is inherent within a recognition
of an armed conflict. The Article requires a recognition which then leads to
the legal effect of the application of Article 3. It makes little difference
whether that recognition is phrased in terms of the nature of the conflict or
the nature of the participants. The legal results would be the same.
Insurgency may be defined as a condition of civil revolt which occupies
a middle ground between belligerency and banditry. 31 The insurgents may
have the same objectives and methods as belligerents, yet are denied that
status because of the absense of some listed precondition. They may also
appear as bandits at times, especially as viewed by the government against
which they are fighting. The distinction here is determined by the political
goal which the insurgents seek, whereas bandits seek personal gain.3 2
The term "armed conflict" is nowhere defined in the Conventions. The
middle ground which it covers is admittedly quite broad, but still it is not
an area incapable of delineation. Since the titles to each of the four
Conventions includes the term "war," it can confidently be asserted that
"... the delegates to the Conference had in mind non-international
conflicts presenting certain analogies to war, and not the type of police
action which happens almost daily in most metropolitan areas." 33
The term is not, in other words, incomprehensibly vague. Writers in this
field of international law have little difficulties in isolating factors which
should call for attaching the label "armed conflict" to any particular hostil-
ities. 34 The determination of the proper criterion is therefore not the
difficulty.
The real problem posed in this area is that the parent state itself may feel
it has a self-interest in not granting recognition of an armed conflict. The
hesitancy of the parent state to concede any level of recognition to rebel
movements obviously presents certain obstacles. Also, some governments
have never ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 3 5
30H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 211, 371; H. KELSEN, supra note
19, at 127.
3 1M. WHITEMAN, supra note 19, at 40.32Baxter, supra note 14, at 338, 344.33Bartelle, Counterinsurgency and Civil War, 40 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 274 (1964).3 4For a discussion of the positions of the delegates to the Geneva Conference on the
proposal to apply the Conventions to conflicts not of an international character see 0. UHLER
& H. COURSIER, supra note 25, 30-31.
35Bolivia had never become a contracting party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. DEPT.
OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, at 342-43, 355 (1971). By January 1, 1971, a total of 134
states were parties to the POW and the Civilian Conventions.
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These hurdles should not prove insurmountable, however, and in no way
call for giving up. The effectiveness of international law lies to a large
extent in self-enforcement, and the proper application of the Geneva Con-
ventions will certainly prove to be no exception to the rule. Three different
arguments or approaches could be followed to persuade parent states to
apply the humanitarian precepts of Article 3.
1. Recognition of Insurgency. One possible approach to this problem
would be to extend recognition of armed conflicts from third-party states.
The present state of international law as to recognizing insurgency appears
to be one of confusion. Sources indicate that "there is no precise definition
of the criteria" 36 or that insurgency is "an incomplete belligerency" 37 and
that the difference "is one of degree." 38
The most sensible approach to the issue, and one which could quite
easily be utilized in the recognition of armed conflicts, is that explained by
Hyde. "Recognition of a condition of insurgency within a foreign country
is an official reckoning with a state of facts."39
As previously indicated, the criteria of when an armed conflict exists
have sufficiently been determined. Formal declarations as to the existence
of those facts, or the passing of diplomatic notes to that effect, would place
more pressure upon the states affected by such hostilities not to deny their
existence. The difference between criteria for a recognition of belligerency
and a recognition of insurgency would thus become both clear and realistic.
The present system of international law presents an inherent con-
tradiction: a civil war or attempt to gain control of a government is not per
se illegal under international law. 40 Yet the parties will never meet the
Hague requirements, so they can never be recognized as lawful belligerents
by third party states, and the present practice is generally to refrain from
recognizing them as insurgents.
Some will say that there is no contradiction here; they will contend that
the guerrillas are utilizing illegal methods so they will just have to forego
their rebellion. The response to just that observation has been convincingly
advanced:
Indeed, a very similar argument was used by the United Kingdom when
it was observed in 1922 that the codified rules of naval warfare forbade
submarine warfare; those unable to rescue the passengers will just have to
forego the use of submarines, argued the United Kingdom-successfully at
3 6T. Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of "in-
ternational Armed Conflict," 71 COL. L. REV. 46 n.39 (1971).3 7J. Kelly, Legal Aspects of Military Operations in Counterinsurgency, 1963 MIL. L.
REV. 99.
38G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (5th ed. 1967).39C. HYDE, supra note 17, at 203 (emphasis added).40H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 249; Baxter, supra note 14, at 343.
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the Washington Naval Conference, with the result that in the world of
affairs the legal restrictions so painfully worked out were ignored. The
result might have been expected. 41
The fact is that guerrilla warfare appears to have gained widespread
acceptance by rebel movements throughout the world. So long as the Law
of Nations remains a rigid, legalistic system, it will simply preclude itself
from influencing certain real situations. Perhaps the time has again come to
review international law as it applies to guerrilla movements.
A change in defining conditions for recognizing belligerency would not
aid the Latin American guerrillas, but the expanded practice of third states
to recognize the "state of facts" of an armed conflict, would clearly appear
desirable as a means to help ensure compliance with the basic humanitarian
provisions of Article 3.42 Again, however, since the present system of
international law does not utilize such a system of recognition, the rebel
forces cannot anticipate recognition of their armed conflict from dis-
interested third states.
2. Article 3 as customary international law. An argument can be ad-
vanced that Article 3 simply represents a codification of customary inter-
national law and is thus binding on all nations, whether or not they have
become signatories to the complete text of the Geneva Convention. Article
3 is no more than a command to observe at least a nominal respect for the
dignity of man.
"It (Article 3) merely demands respect for certain rules, which were
already recognized as essential in all civilized countries, and embodied in
the municipal law of the states in question, long before the Convention was
signed." 43 The enumerated prohibitions are aimed at acts which are so
cruel and inhumane that no State could justify engaging in such activities.
"The requirements of the Article are those which civilized states would be
expected to perform anyway." 44
The major obstacle to arguing that Article 3 represents a codification of
customary international law, is the wording of the Article itself, which
refers to armed conflicts not of an international character "occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." A conflict in the territory
of a non-signatory would thus appear not to be covered.
4 Rubin, supra note 16, at 18- 19.
42"1t (para. 4 of Art. 3) makes it absolutely clear that the object of the Convention is a
purely humanitarian one, that it is in no way concerned with the internal affairs of states, and
that it merely ensures respect for the few essential rules of humanity which all civilized
nations consider as valid everywhere and under all circumstances, and as being above and
outside war itself." 0. UHLER AND H. COURSIER, supra note 25, at 44.
43/d. at 36.
44Bartelle, supra note 33, at 271; R. YINGLING AND R. GINNANE, supra note 19, at 396.
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Such draftsmanship is highly unfortunate, and should be considered for
amendment. The present wording of the clause gives non-signatory States a
purely legalistic argument for not applying the provisions of Article 3. A
review of the history of the Preamble to the Convention does not indicate
that such a position was intended.
A Preamble indicating the general idea behind the Convention was
reportedly dropped, despite the fact that most delegations favored one,
because of "many objections to the proposal to include a reference to the
divine origin of man and to the Creator, regarded as the source of all moral
law."45
It was thought necessary to give an account of the discussions concerning
this Preamble, despite the fact that it was finally dropped altogether, since
some of the ideas it contained have, fortunately, been reproduced in other
Articles of the Convention, especially in Article 3 dealing with armed
conflicts not of an international character. In drafting this latter Article, its
authors based themselves very largely on the general ideas contained in the
various draft Preambles. 46
Again, the resulting draftsmanship appears unfortunate. The Hague
Convention of 1907 expressly stated that it had the object to "revise the
general laws and customs of war." 47 The extremely brief Preamble to the
1949 Geneva Civilians Convention states the purpose "of establishing a
Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War." "Ac-
cordingly, the essential motive which had brought sixty-four nations to-
gether at Geneva, was left unexpressed solely on account of non-essential
additions that one delegation or another wished to make." 48
The resulting draftsmanship of the 1949 Geneva Conventions detracts
somewhat from the argument, that the humanitarian ideals of Article 3
represent a codification of customary international law.49 However, those
ideals would not actually appear to have lost their status of international
law merely from the drafting of a Convention.
In the first place, it may be that some of the provisions (specifically
Article 3) are codifications of customary international law and others are
450. UHLER & H. COURSIER, supra note 25, at 14.
4 61d.
4 7Thus various courts have held that despite the participation clause in the Hague
Convention, non-signatories were still bound to most of the substantive provisions of the
Conventions, "inasmuch as they embody rules of customary International Law." H. LAU-
TERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 234.
480. UHLER & H. COURSIER, supra note 25, at 14.
49
"The spirit which inspires the Geneva Conventions naturally makes it desirable that
they should be applicable erga omnes, since they may be regarded as the codification of
accepted principles. It must be recognized, however, that the Conventions themselves stipu-
late that in order to be binding on States they must be ratified by those States; that being so, it
is difficult to see how they could be applied to the nationals of a State which is not party to
them" Id. at 48.
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not. In fact, since there are so many diverse provisions in the four Con-
ventions, the drafting of the humanitarian ideals into one Article common
to all four Conventions, may have provided greater impact than would the
expression of those ideals in a Preamble.
Alternatively, it is certainly true that customary international law will
continue as such whether it is codified or not. Just because the delegates
were unable to reduce the accepted principles to a Preamble, does not end
the status of the principles when they still remain accepted. The more
persuasive analysis is that Article 3 does represent principles of customary
international law.
3. Demonstration of self-interest. A final approach to encouraging par-
ent state recognition of armed conflict, is in demonstrating to such states
that their self-interest can actually be furthered by such recognition. This
particular possibility will be explored hereunder, when further sections of
the Geneva Conventions and the observance of the Conventions in Latin
American guerrilla conflicts are discussed.
One further Article of the Geneva Conventions must be examined in
order to complete the analysis. Article 2 is, like Article 3, common to all
four of the Conventions. It provides that "the present Convention shall
apply in all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them. ",50
In cases in which one of the parties to the conflict is not a signatory, the
Convention still applies if the non-signatory both accepts and applies all of
the provisions. 51 Such a provision is in contra-distinction to the appli-
cability of Article 3 which binds "each Party to the conflict." z5 2 The
prohibitions of Article 3 are thus absolute-they cannot be avoided by the
failure of the opposing party to follow them. 53
50
"The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupatipn meets with no armed
resistance." Geneva Civilians Convention, Art. 2.51Thi, provision constitutes an abandonment of the participation clause of the Hague
Rules. H. KELSEN, supra note 19, at 126; H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at
234-36, 371; R. YINGLING & R. GINNANE, supra note 19, at 394. "However, if the
legitimate government is not bound by the Convention, the latter cannot be brought into
operation by a declaration of the opposing party that it intends to apply the provisions of the
convention." H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 371 n. I.52Thus, it has been contended that Article 3 binds not only non-signatories, but Parties
not even in existence at the time of the drafting of the Geneva Conventions. "At the
Diplomatic Conference doubt was expressed as to whether insurgents could be legal1y bound
by a Convention which they had not themselves signed. But if the responsible authority at
their head exercises effective sovereignty, it is bound by the very fact that it claims to
represent the country or part of the country." 0. UHLER AND H. COURSIER, supra note 25, at
27. But see R. YINGLING AND R. GINNANNE, supra note 19, at 396. "Insofar as Article 3
purports to bind the insurgent party to the conflict to apply its provisions, its legal efficacy
may be doubted."
53 H. KELSEN, supra note 19, at 127 n. 125.
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The provisions of Article 2 apply when the conflict becomes one of an
'international' character, whereas Article 3 applies to armed conflicts 'not
of an international character'. Therefore, "once the rebellious forces are
recognized by the parent state-and, perhaps, if not by the parent state
then by third states-the conflict takes on an 'international' character, and
Article 2 applies." 54 The parent state, through its control of its power of
recognitition, can thus place the conflict under the direct provisions of
either Article 2 or Article 3.
In summarizing the foregoing analysis concerning the position of guer-
rilla movements under international law, the dominant observation is that
the issue is essentially one of recognition. Under present practice the
guerrillas are unable to qualify for recognition of belligerency from a third
party state due to their inability to satisfy certain standards. Those same
standards effectively preclude their being entitled to the status of prisoners
of war.
The hostilities of the guerrillas thus cannot be afforded an 'international'
status through the efforts of recognition by third party states. The guerrillas
can be covered directly by Article 3 (if the hostilities are recognized as an
armed conflict) or Article 2 (if the parent State recognizes them as bellig-
erents.) Since the present system appears not to allow, or at least not in
practice to allow, recognition of insurgency by third party states, the
guerrillas are clearly dependent upon recognition by the parent state. And
the latter is largely able to place the conflict under the direct provisions of
Articles 2 or 3.
Schwartzenberger has written that patent states might sometimes find it
advisable to recognize rebel movements as belligerents "to ensure that
hostilities are conducted in accordance with the laws of war."'55 Some
might argue, however, that such recognition cannot provide the supposed
"ensurance" on the basis of the claim that "once Article 2 applies, the
parent state is released from any of the obligations laid down by the
Conventions, if the newly recognized belligerent refuses to accept and
apply the provisions thereof."56
However, if that were the case, the government facing a guerrilla revolt
might propose to recognize belligerency in order to achieve a tactical
advantage. Knowing that the guerrillas will not comply with Article I of
the Hague Rules, the governing state might be expected to contend that the
failure to comply relieves it from being bound by the Convention, including
541d.; H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 370 n. 1.55 G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, supra note 38, at 77.
56H. KELSEN, supra note 19, at 127 n.125; contra H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 7, at 211- 12.
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the provisions of Article 3. Recognition of belligerency would thus be used
as a means to escape those basic obligations.
That such a simple evasion of responsibility could be possible is simply
incredible. The answer to such an assertion can only be that no escape
from those minimal provisions is possible-that the provisions in Article 3
are simply a codification of customary international law. The Article is
drawn in terms of minimum provisions "in the case of armed conflict not of
an international character." Yet those same prohibitions, as customary
international law, would be binding also in international conflicts. A recom-
mendation to amend Article 3 to make this result apparent has been
suggested, 57 and clearly seems desirable.
International law does dictate a minimal humanitarian protection for
parties engaged in guerrilla conflicts. But have the parties in the Latin
American conflicts actually practiced the dictates of Article 3? Attention
will now be directed to this inquiry, and to the previously mentioned
discussion on encouraging parent state recognition of the armed conflict as
an advancement of the State's self-interest.
Methods Employed by Guerrillas in Relation to Article 3
The guerrillas in Latin America have pretty well observed sections 1(a),
(c) and (d), and 2 of Article 3. In his manuals on guerrilla warfare, Che
Guevara repeatedly admonishes the insurgents as to the treatment of the
enemy, wounded personnel and civilians. He calls for an attitude of "abso-
lute inflexibility toward all the despicable elements that resort to informing
and assassination," 58 and warns that "enemies can not be permitted to
exist within the zone of operations in places that offer no security." 59
Yet he writes of a humane approach to the conflict. A wounded enemy is
to be treated with "care and respect" and with "all possible resources." 6 0
No prisoners are to be taken, as this would endanger the security of the
insurgent band. Rather, "clemency as absolute as possible" is to be granted
so that a prisoner will be "set free after receiving a lecture." 61
The guerrillas' relations with the civilian population "ought to be regu-
lated by a large respect for all the rules and traditions of the people of the
zone.... ,,2 All merchandise acquired from civilians is to be paid for in
cash, and when no money is available, with "bonds of Hope," "something
that certifies to the debt" and this "should be redeemed at the first oppor-
57See Rubin, supra note 16, at 20, 31.
58 E. GUEVARA, supra note 2, at 28.591d., at 36.601d., at 48, 28.611d., at 28, 46.621d., at 28.
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tunity."63 No special courts are mentioned, but Che does advise that
"except in special situations, there ought to be no execution of justice
without giving the criminal an opportunity to clear himself. " 6 4
The Tupamaros in Uruguay have, at least prior to their kidnappings, also
generally followed a humanitarian program of action. Contact with the
enemy was avoided, and a measure of protection for the civilian population
attempted.65 Guatemalan insurgents, on the other hand, have been in-
volved in numerous incidents which would constitute violations of Article
3. Even their actions toward the civilian population have involved outright
terrorism. 66
For the most part, however, the guerrillas in Latin America have ob-
served most of the sections of Article 3. Such action on their part should
hardly appear surprising. As has already been noted, the provisions of
Article 3 outlaw conduct which is so savage and inhumane that their
observance places no real burden on any party. These same principles
would no doubt generally be observed by the insurgents whether they were
enumerated in Article 3 or not.
It would probably be correct to assume that the guerrillas are not even
aware of Article 3. Yet they do, to a large extent, apply the basic prin-
ciples. Their unawareness of the codification of these concepts does not
detract from the binding effect of Article 3 as international law. To the
extent that the guerrillas actually practice the same principles enumerated
in Article 3 their actions add force to those provisions.
On the other hand, it is clearly relevant that the guerrillas do not relate
their activities directly to international law, nor give any indications that
they would do so if they were aware of the exact provisions. They do not
refrain from certain methods because they would constitute a violation of
international law, but rather because it is to their advantage to do so. The
rejection of the use of terror is thus a practical, not a moral or legal
decision. When they feel obligated to do so, the guerrillas do not refrain
from the use of violent methods.
The escalation in methods of terror can be illustrated by incidents which
constitute clear violations of Article 3(1)(a) and (b), which include prohibi-
tions against violence to life and person and the taking of hostages. Mem-
bers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) gunned down two officers
of the American military mission in Guatemala City. The United States
Ambassador met the same fate when he attempted to escape from a
631d., at 80, 43.641d., at 28.
6Gerassi, supra note 6, at 310.68 Howard, With the Guerrillas in Guatemala, N.Y. Times June 26, 1966, at 25 (Maga-
zine).
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kidnapping attempt. The objective of the movement was to force American
military involvement in Guatemala. They vacillated in choosing to empha-
size their movement as either nationalistic or one of internationalism, but
they always wanted the United States drawn into the struggle.
The Tupamaros shattered their cultivated image when they too turned to
kidnapping foreign officials. Following a plan to capture five individuals,
the Tupamaros succeeded with two in the space of a single day, and later
added another. When the government refused to accede to their demands
to release all imprisoned terrorists, the guerrillas killed one of their hos-
tages.
All of the foregoing arguments advanced by the guerrillas as a rationale
for the escalation of their terror, and which point mostly toward alleged-
United States intervention, are based on an idea of retaliation or reprisal.
Consideration must be directed toward the concept of reprisals in inter-
national law to analyze the legality of the guerrillas' justifications.
Originally, private individuals performed acts of reprisal. They would
forcibly seize property or subjects in retaliation for an injury inflicted upon
them by a foreign country. States later began to perform such acts them-
selves, until reprisals by private persons "finally disappeared totally at the
end of the 18th century." 67 Now the indications are that such acts may
properly be performed only through the authority of a state. Such a holding
would clearly undercut the guerrillas' position.
On the other hand, an argument can be advanced that the guerrillas have
a claim to be entitled to engage in reprisals. Lauterpacht (Oppenheim)
explains that "reprisals are admissable solely and exclusively in the case of
international delinquencies." 6 8 That statement, taken literally, would
include the guerrillas. In any event, an argument can be logically developed
that to the extent that Article 3 gives protections of international law to the
guerrillas, the guerrillas should be permitted to engage in acts of reprisal to
the extent that the other side violates those protections.
Even if the foregoing argument is accepted, however, it provides no legal
basis for the rationale advanced by the guerrillas to justify their attacks and
kidnappings: "Reprisals, be they positive or negative, must be in propor-
tion to the wrong done, and to the amount of compulsion necessary to get
reparation." 69 The killing of hostages clearly goes beyond legal reprisal.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter restricts recourse to armed
reprisals. The comclusion then would be that the guerrillas, like any party
to international law, may engage in reprisals, but only within their legal
scope. The objective must be to secure compliance with Article 3.
67 H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 139.
6 81d. at 137.
6 91d. at 14 1.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
Recent Guerrilla Movements in Latin America
The guerrillas certainly do have a basis for claiming injury, although not
in the direction of the alleged American involvement. In the cases of
kidnappings at least, the motive was clearly based on the hope that the
United States would pressure the Latin American governments into acced-
ing to the rebels' demands. The common slogans of American imperialism
and intervention were simply brandished as convenient labels. The sounder
claim lies with direct violations of Article 3 by the governments opposing
the guerrillas.
Various examples of government action which constitute violations can
be cited. Officials of the Brazilian, Guatemalan and Uruguayan govern-
ments have reportedly administered torture and mutilation on captured
guerrillas. 70 Such conduct by the government would violate sections l(a)
and (c). The evidence is also very strong that Che Guevera was executed
on government orders following his capture, and not, as the official version
was reported, that he died from wounds in the battle with the Bolivian
army. This action would constitute a violation of sections 1 (d) and 2.
Both sides have thus violated Article 3, and it appears that they will both
continue to do so in the future, each justifying its acts on the basis of the
violations by the other. How then is this circle to be broken? In the first
place, recognition is going to have to be given to the fact that these illegal
reprisals are not beneficial.
"Experience, especially during the First and Second World Wars, has
shown that reprisals constitute a dangerous and ineffective means of secur-
ing compliance with the law of war. Instead of inducing the first violator of
the law to observe his international duties (and usually there are difficulties
in ascertaining who was the first to resort to unlawful warfare), reprisals
resulted in a wider and wider abandonment of restrictions imposed on the
belligerents by the law of war."71
Each side should realize that the final arbiter of their conflict, the local
population, is dismayed by terrorism. The population becomes more recep-
tive to the guerrillas' cause when the government treats the insurgents
harshly. On the other hand, the Tupamaros found that much of the public
sympathy they had enjoyed during their earlier days withered away when
they turned to killing and kidnapping. Getting either side to admit the
benefits of leaving out terror is difficult, and naturally is directly related to
the attempt of getting the parent state to recognize the armed conflict.
The government against whom the guerrillas are fighting is certainly in
the best position to improve this situation. The guerrillas are a small group
70NEWSWEEK, supra note 4; Litt and Kohl, Guerrillas of Montevideo, NATION, Feb. 28,
1972; Howard, supra note 66.71Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of War and Neutrality,
in MANUEL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 754 (M. S0rensen ed. 1968).
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which, though perhaps well-organized and highly efficient, is still fighting
against very great odds. The guerrillas facing these obstacles, as well as
illegal acts committed against them in the very area in which they were to
have gained protection, are not likely to make the first step in a
de-escalation of violence. The guerrillas, unaware as they may be of Article
3, are aware of humanitarian principles. Their observance of these prin-
ciples is unlikely, so long as there is no corresponding protection to them-
selves.
The governments, however, should be well aware of the codification, as
well as the existence of these principles. They also hold the stronger
position. The government certainly has the right to try to put down rebel
movements within its territory. But such actions must be carried out with
the observance of Article 3, if there is to be any hope that the present
pattern of violence will be broken. The requirements of Article 3 are so
minimal that they certainly would not overburden the government's at-
tempts to deal with the guerrillas.
The following statement by Lauterpacht (Oppenheim) goes directly to
the heart of the matter, and perhaps points the way to an eventual
de-escalation of terror in the Latin American guerrilla movements:
While the detaining state is entitled to put on trial prisoners of war for
ordinary crimes and war crimes committed prior to captivity and offenses
committed during captivity, utmost restraint-dictated in addition by the ap-
prehension of provoking reprisals-must be exercised in the matter of trials
arising from what is in essence a political crime of treason and rebellion.72
It is indeed a sad reflection on the nature of mankind that the basic
humanitarian provisions of Article 3 have too often been violated. Perhaps
some distant generation will someday question why they were even
needed. In the meantime, concerned nations and individuals should seek
answers as to how the observance of those provisions can best be encour-
aged.
72H. LAUTERPACHT-L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 7, at 210-11 (emphasis added).
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